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Meeting: |
Executive |
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Meeting date: |
9 September 2026 |
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Report of: |
Director of Environment and Regulatory Services and Director of City Development |
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Portfolio of: |
Councillor Kate Ravilious, Executive Member for Transport |
Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order - statutory consultation response
Subject of Report
1. This report provides a review of the representations received during the statutory consultation process for the proposed introduction of a permanent Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order (ATTRO) for the city centre. If a permanent ATTRO is approved this would lie dormant for the majority of the time and would only be activated when the threat level meets the required thresholds.
2. The proposal was made following a recommendation from the Chief Constable of North Yorkshire Police (NYP) to consider the implementation of a permanent ATTRO (Annex D).
3. The statutory consultation was undertaken following approval from the Executive on 12 October 2023 “to start the process and consultation of developing an Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order and some events may mean access is restricted for the event” (available here: https://democracy.york.gov.uk/ieDecisionDetails.aspx?ID=6951).
4. The report recommends the implementation of a permanent ATTRO for the pedestrianised area and the area near the Minster, as recommended by North Yorkshire Police.
Benefits and Challenges
5. An ATTRO is a special legal order that allows Councils and the Police to restrict or close off vehicle and pedestrian access to specific streets and public spaces and put measures in place, to protect people from the threat of terrorism on or near a road.
6. An ATTRO can only be put in place by a Council, when recommended by the Police for the purposes of “avoiding or reducing, or reducing the likelihood of, danger connected with terrorism” or "preventing or reducing damage connected with terrorism” (as defined by Section 22C of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984). An ATTRO cannot be used for any other reason.
7. In York, temporary ATTROs have been implemented previously for events such as the Christmas Market and royal visits. This has usually resulted in additional access restrictions, for example, most vehicles were prevented from accessing the footstreets area during the Christmas Market’s hours of operation in 2025. The additional access restrictions applied to vehicles carrying Blue Badge holders, vehicles carrying out non-emergency repairs, and waste vehicles.
8. The local authority makes the decision to implement an ATTRO (and associated access restrictions and protective measures) but must consider advice and recommendations from the Police. Refusal to implement an ATTRO after receipt of a recommendation from a Chief Constable would be an unprecedented event nationally.
9. An ATTRO can be either temporary or permanent, as described below.
· A temporary ATTRO is recommended by the Police and implemented by the Council for one specific short-term event or incident, like a Christmas market, a busy public gathering, or a VIP visit (like a royal visit). The Police makes a recommendation based on the information they have on terrorism risks, and the Council must review the recommendation, make a decision, and process a brand-new temporary order each time it is needed. The temporary order is active only for the duration of that single event, then it ends.
· A permanent ATTRO, if put in place, is kept dormant, as a standing legal framework ready to be activated when the Police believe that activating the ATTRO would be a proportionate counter terrorism response for regular events, sudden security needs, or emergencies, for the area covered by the order. If approved, a permanent order enables the Council to react quickly to Police advice without having to process a new temporary order every time. The order always remains legally in place but is unused most of the time until it is activated by the Council on a temporary basis where needed, following Police recommendation.
10. The decision-making process for a temporary ATTRO and a permanent ATTRO differs as described below.
11. For a temporary ATTRO due to an event or circumstance-specific decision, the process is broadly:
· Police identify a terrorism-related risk associated with a particular event, incident, intelligence or period;
· The Chief Officer of Police recommends an ATTRO to the traffic authority (the Council);
· Council officers consider the specific Police recommendation and decide:
o whether an ATTRO is justified;
o what roads/areas should be covered;
o what restrictions or protective measures are proportionate;
o and for how long;
· Officers provide the Executive with options and recommendations on the proposed extent/impact of the Temporary ATTRO for approval to implement;
· The Executive makes a public decision on the implementation of the ATTRO;
· Consideration of how the ATTRO will be communicated;
· The ATTRO is then implemented for the particular circumstances.
12. This means that the Council makes a fresh substantive decision each time a temporary ATTRO is proposed.
13. For the activation of the permanent ATTRO due to an event or specific circumstances, the process is broadly:
· Police identify a terrorism-related risk associated with a particular event, incident, intelligence or period;
· The Chief Officer of Police recommends to the traffic authority that the dormant ATTRO is put into operation;
· Officers consider the extent of the dormant ATTRO to be put into effect and review the framework for putting it in place and the required communications;
· Chief Executive approves the activation of the ATTRO in line with the framework process and the ATTRO is put into operation.
14. The main benefits of a permanent ATTRO are operational, for the Council, the Police, event organisers, and other stakeholders involved in events planning and security. The permanent ATTRO would only be activated in accordance with the draft Order (presented at Annex C), including Schedule 2 which sets out the operational requirements to ensure that any restrictions will be the minimum necessary to remove to reduce the danger and are consistent with the statutory requirements for making ATTROs.
15. A permanent ATTRO, if approved, would provide the following benefits:
· A permanent ATTRO enables the Police and the Council to set up delegations within their organisations, so that decisions can be made more effectively, especially in cases where an urgent decision is required. Some of these delegations are described in Annex C as they would be part of the Order, others are included in the recommendations in this report.
· A permanent ATTRO enables all partners to work together to establish a jointly agreed decision-making framework to enable quick decisions to be made on the level of restrictions and/or protective measures required based on national threat levels, intelligence, event risk profiles, etc. This would also include an assessment of the impact of the restrictions on groups with protected characteristics under the Equality Act and consideration of mitigation measures to reduce the impact of the restrictions, where possible. This type of framework is in place in other cities where a permanent ATTRO has been implemented.
· A summary of this assessment framework would be shared with event organisers in advance so that they can plan early for the restrictions, protective measures, and mitigation measures that they may need to implement and manage for their event. This will support early financial planning and viability assessments for event organisers.
· This would also improve communications, as communication protocols can be agreed in advance for different types of events and incidents, helping to inform residents, businesses, and visitors in advance (where possible). This would help to identify and inform individuals and groups affected by access restrictions in advance (where possible).
16. The implementation of a permanent ATTRO does not have any impact on the number of events or incidents when additional access restrictions are implemented. The Police make recommendations on the need for an ATTRO based on their assessment of the risks in relation to a specific threat of terrorism or to deal with a terrorist incident. If the Police identify the need for an ATTRO, they will recommend this course of action regardless of whether this requires a new temporary ATTRO or the activation of a permanent ATTRO.
17. The activation of a permanent ATTRO does not have an impact on the level of restrictions and/or protective measures required for a specific event or incident. This is determined by the Council, based on the assessment of risks, advice from the Police and assessment of the impact of access restrictions on groups with protected characteristics under the Equality Act. A permanent ATTRO would however enable these decisions to be made in a more streamlined way, using an agreed assessment framework. It would also enable partners to agree in advance on a range of possible mitigation measures to reduce the impact of access restrictions, which could be put in place during events.
18. The activation of a permanent ATTRO does not have an impact on costs and financial liabilities. Although the permanent ATTRO will be activated though a recommendation from the Police, the Council remains liable for all costs associated with the ATTRO, unless the Council decides to charge the beneficiary of the ATTRO, such as an event organiser, for the costs associated with the order. Charges relating to an ATTRO may not however be imposed on the organisers of a public event or assembly, such as a protest march or political rally. In this case, the Council would remain liable for all costs incurred (this applies to all measures implemented regardless of whether the ATTRO is temporary or permanent).
Policy Basis for Decision
Council policies and decision making
19. The 10-year plan sets a vision that everyone can benefit from and take pride in the city, with the Council Plan setting a priority that the Council will set the conditions for a healthier, fairer, more affordable, more sustainable, and more accessible place where everyone can feel valued.
20. This vision sets a clear policy that an accessible place is a priority for the Executive. The Executive has set out Four Core objectives in the Council Plan, which are those outcomes they believe will most support the delivery of their vision, one of which is: “Equalities and Human Rights - Equality of opportunity - We will create opportunities for all, providing equal opportunity and balancing the human rights of everyone to ensure residents and visitors alike can benefit from the city and its strengths. We will stand up to hate and work hard to champion our communities”.
21. As is the case when a temporary ATTRO is recommended, the activation of the permanent ATTRO will require a balancing exercise to be undertaken by both the Police and the Council, considering the Public Sector Equality Duty and rights under Articles 2, 8, and 14 of Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
22. In making a decision on the ATTRO, the Executive is asked to consider both the ‘absolute’ right to life and the ‘qualified’ protection from discrimination. This relates to the legal distinctions contained in the Human Rights Act 1998 in relation to the Articles contained in Schedule 1 to that Act.
23. In brief, some rights (called Absolute rights), can never be restricted. These include Articles 3 (the right not to suffer torture), 4 (the right not to be subject to slavery), and 7 (there shall be no punishment without law).
24. The remaining rights (called Restricted rights) may be restricted, but only to protect the rights of others. These are divided into Limited rights (such as Article 2, the right to life, which can only be restricted through operation of a legal sentence following conviction, or “the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; or (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection”) and Qualified rights to protection from discrimination (such as Article 8, the right to respect for private and family life, which may be interfered with by a public authority “... in accordance with the law and [where] necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”)
25. The Human Rights Act 1998 does not provide an order of precedence for the operation of the various rights set out in the Schedule (including rights to protection from discrimination); however, it is clear from the above that the Council cannot proactively choose to interfere with Article 2 rights, but can proactively choose to interfere with Articles 8 and 11 (the right to freedom of assembly and association), should it conclude that interference is proportionate to achieving the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others. It is clear that the Chief Constable has carried out that balancing exercise in making his recommendation for a permanent ATTRO.
26. The Executive will now need to make a proportionate decision on the implementation of the proposed permanent ATTRO, having regard to all impacts, to reach a balanced decision, including the Council’s responsibilities under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Public Sector Equalities Duty (PSED). The Executive should, however, give significant weight in that exercise to the Chief Constable’s recommendation. Whilst the Chief Constable’s recommendation is not determinative of the issue, the Executive would need extremely compelling alternative factors to outweigh that recommendation. Such factors do not appear to apply here.
27. When recommending the activation of the ATTRO, the Police will be required to carry out that balancing exercise before making the recommendation. The Council will then need to make a proportionate decision, having regard to all impacts, to reach a balanced decision including the Council’s responsibilities under the Public Sector Equalities Duty and relevant Human Rights considerations and giving significant weight to the Police recommendation.
National legislation and guidance
28. City of York Council is working with Counter Terrorism Policing through ACT for Local Authorities, an initiative to support local government to embed counter terrorism considerations into day-to-day work. ACT specifically focuses on the Protect and Prepare elements of the UK government’s counter terrorism strategy. The Protect strand aims to “strengthen the United Kingdom’s protection against terrorist attacks” while the Prepare strand aims to “minimise the impact of an attack and reduce the likelihood of further attacks”.
29. ACT for Local Authorities addresses protective security and preparedness planning holistically across public spaces, which are either owned, managed, or influenced by local authorities. ACT is separate, yet complementary, to the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act 2025, also known as Martyn’s Law.
30. The Act places greater responsibility on individual qualifying premises and events to enhance their counter terrorism planning, by requiring them to consider how they would respond to a terrorist attack. In addition to this, at certain larger premises and events, appropriate steps to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks must also be considered.
Financial Strategy Implications
31. If the recommended option is approved, the cost of making the permanent order and developing a jointly agreed decision-making framework would be funded from the service’s existing budgets. This should be lower than the costs of having to implement temporary ATTROs when recommended.
32. Other costs apply regardless of whether a temporary or a permanent ATTRO is in place. For example, if additional temporary infrastructure is required to protect the area where the ATTRO is activated and/or additional traffic management and diversion signage is required, an event organiser may be asked to cover these costs, regardless of the type of ATTRO implemented.
33. It is important to note that these costs cannot be imposed on the organisers of a public event or assembly, such as a protest march or political rally. In this case, the costs would rest fully with the Council. Decisions on the recharge of the costs for temporary infrastructure, will be made on an event-by-event basis. This is applicable regardless of the type of ATTRO.
Recommendation and Reasons
34. The Executive is recommended to:
a) Consider the representations received during the statutory consultation;
b) Approve the making of the permanent ATTRO (as per the draft order provided in Annex C);
c) Delegate the decision to activate the permanent ATTRO on the receipt of a Police recommendation to do so to the Chief Executive of the Council;
d) Approve the development and implementation of an agreed decision-making framework for the permanent ATTRO’s activation with the Chief Executive of the Council working in conjunction with the Leader of the Council and relevant Executive Members.
Reasons: To respond to the recommendation from the Chief Constable of North Yorkshire Police (NYP) to consider the making of a permanent ATTRO (Annex D), having taken into account the representations received during the statutory consultation process and all other relevant considerations.
Background
35. The statutory consultation was undertaken following the recommendation from the Chief Constable of North Yorkshire Police (NYP) to consider the implementation of a permanent ATTRO (Annex D). It followed the approval from the Executive on 12 October 2023 “to start the process and consultation of developing an Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order and some events may mean access is restricted for the event” (available here: https://democracy.york.gov.uk/ieDecisionDetails.aspx?ID=6951).
36. Following this decision, City of York Council worked with NYP to understand how a permanent ATTRO could be set up and how it would operate if approved. A proposal for a permanent ATTRO was drafted so that the Council and NYP could understand the detail and requirements that would be placed on each party should the proposed ATTRO be put in place. The draft order now proposed for approval is presented at Annex C.
37. The area to be covered by the permanent ATTRO, if approved, includes the pedestrianised area, which is protected by permanent Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) measures. It also includes areas which do not benefit form permanent protective measures: College Street, Deangate, Duncombe Place, High Petergate, Minster Gates, Minster Yard, Precentors Court and The Queen’s Path.
38. The proposed area includes the area around the Minster, as temporary ATTROs have previously been implemented in this area due to activities occurring at the Minster. In recent years on New Year’s Eve the Council has also installed temporary HVM on Duncombe Place, due to the gathering of people to celebrate the New Year.
39. In June 2025, a report was presented to the Executive Member for Transport, to request approval to undertake the statutory consultation for the proposed permanent ATTRO. The statutory consultation documents (presented an Annexes E and F) were prepared following the decision by the Executive Member.
Consultation Analysis
40. The statutory consultation was advertised on 18th March 2026, providing an 8-week consultation period, for representations to be received in response to the proposal. The proposal was advertised on street, in a locally circulated newspaper and letters and leaflets were posted to all registered Blue Badge holders (Annex E) and all residents/businesses (Annex F) within the proposed area.
41. The statutory consultation information was also placed on the Council website along with an Easy Read version of the materials. The Easy Read version was also available at the Customer Services area in West Offices. The Council’s Communications Team also created posters to publicise the proposal, which were placed in all Libraries and Explore Centres. The posters had QR codes, to enable additional information to be viewed on the Council’s website.
42. The statutory consultation received representations both against and in favour of the proposed ATTRO. Most of the representations received against the proposal (Annex G), were in relation to how the ATTRO would operate and who would be affected by the implementation of the ATTRO.
43. The Council received representations from Blue Badge holders about the impact on their access should the proposed permanent ATTRO be approved. Some of the representations received from Blue Badge holders gave the impression that the authors thought that access restrictions linked to the ATTRO would be in place permanently, which would remove vehicular access for Blue Badge holders during pedestrianised hours. This is not the case, as the ATTRO will lay dormant for the majority of the time and temporary restrictions put in place when the ATTRO is activated may vary. For example, restrictions on vehicle access when the ATTRO is activated may only be in place for a section of the proposed ATTRO area. It is also important to note that this does not change whether the ATTRO implemented is a temporary or a permanent ATTRO. Under a temporary ATTRO, if the event or incident for which an ATTRO has been recommended by the Police is deemed to require strict access restrictions, Blue Badge holders and other vehicles would be prevented from accessing the area of concern. The implementation of a permanent ATTRO does not make this more or less likely as the decision is based on risk levels and the assessments made for the specific event or incident.
44. Some representations raised concerns about the removal of vehicular access for Blue Badge holders and queried why this access would be removed, when badges are checked in the street, before access is granted. The advice from counter-terrorism experts is to reduce the number of vehicles to an absolute minimum in secure areas where an ATTRO is activated and hostile vehicle mitigation measures are in place. This is because vehicles can be stolen or deception can be used to gain access. See here for national guidance: https://www.protectuk.police.uk/hostile-vehicle-mitigation-hvm This is applicable to both temporary and permanent ATTROs.
45. Some representations queried the effectiveness of vehicle access restrictions and vehicle removal as it was expressed that this would not stop the risk of bombs being transported into the area in backpack or pushchairs. Respondents expressed the views that, unless checks are going to occur on all bags, pushchairs etc, the risk of terrorism in the pedestrian area will still exist. It is accepted by counter-terrorism experts that other risks of attacks will remain. Expert advice focuses on reducing and mitigating the risks as far as possible. The ATTROs (temporary or permanent), the access restrictions, and Hostile Vehicle Mitigation measures reduce the risks from vehicle-borne threats, specifically vehicle-ramming attacks and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices but they do not remove all risks of attacks.
46. Some representations objected to the extent of the proposed area, as it extends beyond the existing Hostile Vehicle Mitigation measures (HVMs). The objections to the additional area outside of the HVMs were linked to residents and businesses in the extended area being unsure as to how access to their properties would be managed. The impact on businesses and residents if the ATTRO is activated in a specific area is difficult to comment on, as the impact will depend on the specific requirements of the ATTRO for the specific event or incident (applicable to both temporary and permanent ATTROs).
47. If the implementation is required for an event, a servicing period outside of the event’s operational hours will generally be provided. For example, under the temporary ATTRO for the Christmas market, access is permitted after 7pm. If the ATTRO (temporary or permanent) is put in place due to an incident or specific intelligence on a threat, access may be restricted until it is deemed safe for the public to access the area. There has previously been temporary ATTROs put in place in Duncombe Place for emergency services events, the King’s visit, and for a funeral of a North Yorkshire Police officer, and access requirements were managed for residents according to the event profile and risks.
48. There were concerns raised about the notice period that would be provided if the ATTRO is to be put into operation. It is difficult to provide a full response as the reason for activating the ATTRO will dictate the notice period. There will potentially be times when the ATTRO could be activated without notice due to urgency, for example in the case of a terrorist incident having taken place. This is applicable to temporary and permanent ATTROs.
49. If a permanent ATTRO is approved, the stakeholders involved would aim to develop an agreed Communication Plan so that all steps are agreed in advance for different types of events and incidents. This should help support communications where advance warning can be provided.
50. A representation was also received asking for the use of the ATTRO to be limited, so it would only be activated for 10-15 days a year. This would not be possible to implement, as the Police can request an ATTRO (temporary or permanent) whenever they assess that restrictions are required. Restrictions could be required for an event, activity, or increased threat levels connected with terrorism, this is not something that can be planned.
51. Objections were also received against a permanent ATTRO, with a suggestion that if an ATTRO is required it should continue to be processed through a temporary ATTRO, with the author stating it does not take long to implement a temporary ATTRO. This objection agreed that ATTROs need to be considered but raised concerns about the making of a permanent ATTRO, stating that it would encourage a police state. The benefits and challenges of implementing a permanent ATTRO are presented at the start of this report.
52. There were also representations that stated York is not a high risk from terrorism and that terrorism is not an issue in the UK like in the USA. This is contrary to counter-terrorism experts’ opinion as the current national threat level in the UK is “severe, meaning an attack is highly likely”.
53. A suggestion was made that if the Christmas Market increases the risk of terrorism in the city, then consideration should be given to cancelling the Christmas market to reduce the risk that it brings. This is not a matter which can be considered in this report.
54. There was also a suggestion that if the proposal is approved, a resident would raise a legal challenge against the decision. The grounds for such a challenge were unclear, so it is not possible to provide comment on the risk of a legal challenge based on this specific representation, although legal advice is provided as part of this report.
55. The representations received in favour of the ATTRO (Annex H) were based around the fact that, if the ATTRO is required to be put in place, it would be done so to help keep everyone safe, which should be the priority. A representation received from a Blue Badge holder stated that they would consider the removal of access for Blue Badge holders to the city centre for a limited time to ensure public safety, stating that it is a small price to pay in unpredictable times.
56. There were also representations in favour of the proposal who cited the growing terrorist threat that is seen in the world today, which is reflected in the current national threat level. Representations also listed other cities in the UK, where vehicles have been used as part of an attack in recent times, to help illustrate the need for the ATTRO. One representation stated that one vehicle is enough and that allowing exceptions or concessions, weakens the ATTRO and introduces vulnerabilities that cannot be controlled in real-world conditions.
57. A representation stated that the proposal did not go far enough and questioned why the proposal did not include the Minster and the Minster gardens. If the proposed ATTRO is approved it would only be put in place on the highway within the proposed area, which would not include the Minster or the Gardens as they are private areas.
58. Finally, residents in support of the proposal raised concerns that if approved, the ATTRO and associated restrictions should only be put into effect if strict requirements are met and that support to tourism should not be a consideration when deciding on the implementation of an ATTRO and associated measures. This would not be a consideration for the implementation of the ATTRO, but York is an internationally known city, which attracts thousands of visitors from all over the world, so this does increase the risk.
Option Analysis and
Evidential Basis
Option A - Implement the permanent Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order and associated delegations as proposed (recommended)
59. The original request from NYP was for the proposed area, which is wider than the pedestrian area currently protected by HVMs. The extended area was originally requested to offer protection for the area in front of the Minster. Both the pedestrian area and the Minster area have previously been subject to access restrictions under temporary ATTROs. This requirement is likely to continue and the implementation of a permanent ATTRO for the whole area would enable the partners involved to establish an agreed decision-making framework and communication protocols, to help reduce operational delay with implementation when it is deemed necessary to put the ATTRO in place.
Option B - Implement the Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order for the area protected by HVMs only and the recommended delegations (not recommended)
60. This would seem logical as the permanent ATTRO area would be covered by permanent HVMs, so the area could be closed off without the requirement for additional temporary HVMs (and associated resource implications).
61. In practice however, additional temporary HVMs would still be required if an area which is not currently covered by permanent HVMs needs to be protected (this could also be a smaller area within the pedestrian area). If the permanent ATTRO doesn’t cover this area, the Police’s recommendation would be for a temporary ATTRO and additional protective measures would have to be considered. As noted above, the Council has the ability to recover the costs associated with an ATTRO and protective measures from an event organiser (but this does not apply to all events, and the Council will need to make a decision on cost recovery on a case by case basis).
62. As noted above, the Minster area is likely to continue requiring temporary ATTROs for events and New Year’s Eve, so it makes sense to include the area within the permanent ATTRO (if approved).
Option C – Do not implement a permanent ATTRO and continue to manage events and incidents through temporary ATTROs (not recommended)
63. This is the do-nothing option under which the ATTRO and associated access restrictions’ operation must be agreed between partners every time the Police recommends a temporary ATTRO.
64. The lack of clarity on delegated decisions on ATTROs also means that some decisions have to be presented to the Executive, requiring significant additional time and resources for the Police’s recommendations to be considered and decisions to be made by the Council.
65. This would reduce the efficiency in putting a recommended ATTRO in place, which may result in poorer outcomes. It also means that it is very difficult for event organisers to plan for the requirements of an ATTRO (and the costs associated with this), as there is no guidance available for them on what these requirements are going to be when they plan their event.
66. The majority of the objections to the proposal are around the impact on access for businesses, residents, and Blue Badge holders. This option does not address these concerns. The same issues would remain on the occasions when a temporary ATTRO is required. The lack of agreed frameworks and protocols would continue to have a negative impact on businesses, residents, Blue Badge holders, and event organisers.
Organisational Impact and Implications
67. The following implications have been identified:
· Financial - If the recommended option is approved, the cost of making the permanent order and developing a jointly agreed decision-making framework would be funded from the service’s existing budgets. This should be lower than the costs of having to implement temporary ATTROs when recommended.
Other costs apply regardless of whether a temporary or a permanent ATTRO is in place. For example, if additional temporary infrastructure is required to protect the area where the ATTRO is activated and/or additional traffic management and diversion signage is required, an event organiser may be asked to cover these costs, regardless of the type of ATTRO implemented.
It is important to note that these costs cannot be imposed on the organisers of a public event or assembly, such as a protest march or political rally. In this case, the costs would rest fully with the Council. Decisions on the recharge of the costs for temporary infrastructure, will be made on an event-by-event basis. This is applicable regardless of the type of ATTRO.
· Human Resources (HR) - No implications identified
· Legal - Sections 6, 22C and 22D of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (as amended by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004) enables traffic orders to be put in place by the traffic authority for the purposes of avoiding or reducing the likelihood of danger connected with terrorism, or preventing or reducing damage connected with terrorism. An ATTRO can only be made on the recommendation of the Chief Constable of Police. The making of an ATTRO follows the same statutory procedure as for a Traffic Regulation Order under The Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) 1996.
As traffic authority, the Council has the duty to secure the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of traffic (having regard to the effect on amenities) (s122 Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984). When considering any restrictions proposed, the traffic authority has to consider its duty (as stated above) against the factors mentioned in Section 1 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. Schedule 2 to the ATTRO sets out requirements aimed at meeting these duties by ensuring that any restrictions will be the minimum necessary to remove or reduce the danger and are consistent with the statutory requirements for making such an order.
The Council must comply with the Public Sector Equality Duty as set out in Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 when considering the request to make the ATTRO.
In considering the request for the ATTRO, there is also a duty to act in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights as explained further in the Human Rights and Equalities Implications section below.
· Procurement - No implications identified
· Health and Wellbeing - No implications identified
· Environment and Climate action - No implications identified
· Affordability – No implications identified as this report does not propose any changes that would affect affordability.
· Equalities and Human Rights, - As is the case when a temporary ATTRO is recommended, the activation of the permanent ATTRO (if approved as recommended) will require a balancing exercise to be undertaken by both the Police and the Council, considering the Public Sector Equality Duty and rights under Articles 2, 8, and 14 of Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998. This is described in more detail in the body of this report – see “Policy Basis for Decision” section.
· Data Protection and Privacy – No implications identified as this report does not propose any changes that would affect personal data.
· Communications - A permanent ATTRO would enable more effective communications with local residents, businesses and others, through the development of a set of template communications to cover its implementation for particular events and issues. We know from previous experience that the decision-making process around temporary ATTROs can lead to significant communication issues.
· Economy: The recommended approach allows for a more planned and efficient way of managing risks associated with the threat of terrorism attack and is welcomed.
Risks and Mitigations
68. All relevant risks are identified in the body of the report when comparing the do-nothing option with the option to implement a permanent ATTRO.
Wards Impacted
69. Guildhall Ward for the proposed permanent ATTRO area and all wards for access to the city centre.
Contact details
For further information please contact the authors of this Decision Report.
Author
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Name: |
Dave Atkinson |
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Job Title: |
Director of Environmental & Regulatory Services |
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Service Area: |
Environmental and Regulatory Services |
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Email: |
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Report approved: |
Yes |
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Date: |
18 August 2026 |
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Name: |
Garry Taylor |
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Job Title: |
Director of City Development |
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Service Area: |
City Development |
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Email: |
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Report approved: |
Yes |
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Date: |
18 August 2026 |
Co-author
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Name: |
Darren Hobson |
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Job Title: |
Highway Regulation Manager |
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Service Area: |
Environmental and Regulatory Services |
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Email: |
Background papers
Executive Decision dated 12 October 2023 https://democracy.york.gov.uk/ieDecisionDetails.aspx?ID=6951
Executive Decision dated 3 March 2026
https://democracy.york.gov.uk/ieDecisionDetails.aspx?ID=7654
Executive Decision dated 17 June 2026
https://democracy.york.gov.uk/ieDecisionDetails.aspx?ID=7445
Annexes
· Annex A: Human Rights and Equality Assessment (HREA)
· Annex B: Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) (Not required)
· Annex C: Draft City Centre ATTRO
· Annex D: NYP ATTRO Request letter
· Annex E: Consultation letter to Blue Badge holders
· Annex E1: Consultation leaflet
· Annex F: Consultation letter to business and residents
· Annex G: Representations received against the proposal
· Annex H: Representations received in support of the proposal